Non-Interference is an information flow security property which aims to protect confidential data by ensuring the complete absence of any information flow from high level entities to low level ones. However, this requirement is too demanding when dealing with real applications: indeed, no real policy ever guarantees a total absence of information flow. In order to deal with real applications, it is often necessary to allow mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information such as information filters and channel control.
INTRODUCTION
Non-Interference is an information flow security property which aims to protect confidential data by ensuring the complete absence of any information flow from high level entities to low level ones. The concept of non-interference has been introduced by Goguen Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. VALUETOOLS 2019, March 12-15, 2019 , Palma, Spain © 2019 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6596-3/19/03. . . $15.00 https://doi.org /10.1145/3306309.3306329 and Meseguer in [10, 11] . Since then, a large body of work has led to a variety of definitions for different application contexts. A systematic overview is given in [12] .
In this paper we consider the notion of non-interference presented in [15] for stochastic, cooperating, processes expressed as terms of the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA) [13] . The property Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI ) introduced in [15] is based on an observation equivalence that relies on the concept of lumpability ensuring that, for a secure process P, the steady state probability of observing the system being in a specific state P ′ is independent from its possible high level interactions. In other words, we assume that the observer is able to observe any execution path with its delays and also to measure some timing properties like, e.g., the response time or the throughput. Hence a system S is secure if any external observer is not able to distinguish the behaviour of S performing confidential, high level, activities from the behaviour of the same system but prevented from performing any high level action.
However, as extensively discussed in the literature, absolute noninterference can hardly be achieved in real systems. In order to deal with real applications, it is often necessary to allow mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information. The aim of our work is that of generalizing the non-interference property PSNI in order to admit mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information such as information filters and channel control. We are not aware of any work dealing with forms of delimited information release in the context of stochastic processes.
Related work. The problem of modelling information flow policies admitting some forms of downgrading has first been addressed by Goguen and Meseguer in [11] . The authors introduce the notion of conditional non-interference which admits flows from a high level of security to a low one through a controlled or trusted part. The notion of intransitive non-interference has been introduced by Rushby in [23] to formally develop a theory of downgrading for deterministic systems. Indeed, the non-interference property is said to be intransitive since flows from the high level to a trusted part and flows from the trusted part to the low level are admissible assuming that the trusted part takes care of controlling them, while a direct flow from high to low is not allowed. In the context of process algebras, intransitive non-interference has been formulated by Roscoe and Goldsmith in [22] for deterministic CSP processes.
Intransitive flow policies for non-deterministic systems have been studied by Mantel in [19] . A few years later Backes and Pfitzmann propose in [2] a definition of intransitive probabilistic noninterference for reactive systems. In [20] Mullins presents a property named Admissible Interference for processes expressed as terms of the CCS process algebra.
All the properties mentioned above are based on trace equivalences and thus they are not suitable to deal with information flows caused by possible deadlocks occurring in concurrent computations. To cope with this problem, Ryan and Schneider in [24] introduce the notions of partial and conditional information flows in the context of CSP processes. Finally, Lafrance and Mullins in [17] introduce the notion of Bisimulation-based Non-deterministic Admissible Interference (BNAI ) which is a generalization of the property presented in [4, 5, [7] [8] [9] 21] . In [26] von Oheimb provides automata based definitions for both deterministic and non-deterministic systems and both transitive and intransitive policies. Downgrading in the context of CCS processes has been modelled by some of the authors of this paper in [6] .
Contribution of the paper. We present a generalization of the notion of Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI ) in order to allow information to flow from a higher to a lower security level through a downgrader. We introduce the notion of Delimited Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (D_PSNI ) and provide two characterizations of it, one expressed in terms of bisimulation-like equivalence checks and another one formulated through unwinding conditions [3, 18] . As for PSNI, the property that we propose is strictly related to the lumping of Markov chains since the observation equivalence at the base of our definition relies on the notion of lumpability [14] . As a consequence if P is secure then, from the low level point of view, the steady state probability of observing the system being in a specific state P ′ is independent from the possible high level, confidential, interactions of P. Then we prove some compositionality properties and show the relationships between the notions of PSNI and D_PSNI. Finally, we present a decision algorithm and discuss its complexity.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the process algebra PEPA and the observation equivalence named lumpable bisimilarity. Property PSNI and its characterizations are presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces our novel security property D_PSNI and gives two characterizations of it. In Section 5 we describe an algorithm to decide whether a PEPA component is D_PSNI. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
THE LANGUAGE
In this section we briefly recall the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA) [13] .
Syntax. The PEPA language [13] consists of two basic elements: components and activities. Activities are pairs (α , r ) where α is called action type and belongs to a countable set A, while r is called activity rate and belongs to the set R + ∪ {⊤} where the symbol ⊤ is used to denote an unspecified rate. Hence, the duration of an activity is modelled as a negative exponential distribution with mean r −1 . The special action type τ ∈ A is used to denote the unknown type.
The PEPA language provides a small set of combinators. These allow language terms to be constructed defining the behaviour of components, via the activities they undertake and the interactions between them. The syntax for PEPA terms is given by the following grammar:
where S denotes a sequential component, while P denotes a model component which can be obtained as the cooperation of sequential terms. We denote by C the set of all possible components.
Operational semantics. Table 1 shows the operational semantics of the PEPA language. The component (α , r ).P carries out the activity (α , r ) of type α at rate r and subsequently behaves as component P. P +Q specifies a system which may behave either as P or as Q. P +Q enables all the current activities of both P and Q. The first activity to complete distinguishes one of the components, P or Q. The other component of the choice is discarded. The component P/L behaves as P except that any activity of type within the set L are hidden, i.e., they are relabelled with the unknown type τ . The meaning of a constant A is given by a defining equation such as A def = P which gives the constant A the behaviour of the component P. The cooperation combinator ▷ ◁ L is in fact an indexed family of combinators, one for each possible set of action types, L ⊆ A \ {τ }. The cooperation set L defines the action types on which the components must synchronise or cooperate (the unknown action type, τ , may not appear in any cooperation set). It is assumed that each component proceeds independently with the activities whose types do not occur in the cooperation set L (individual activities). However, activities with action types in L require the simultaneous involvement of both components (shared activities). The shared activity will have the same action type as the two contributing activities and its rate is that of the slower component. If in a component an activity has rate ⊤, then we say that it is passive with respect to that action type. In this case the rate of the shared activity will be that of the other component. For a given component P and action type α, the apparent rate of α in P, r α (P), is the sum of the rates of the α activities enabled in P.
The semantics of each term in PEPA is given via a labelled multitransition system where the multiplicities of arcs are significant. In the transition system, a state or derivative corresponds to each syntactic term of the language and an arc represents the activity which causes one derivative to evolve into another. The set of reachable states of a model P is termed the derivative set of P (ds(P)) and constitutes the set of nodes of the derivation graph of P (D(P)) obtained by applying the semantic rules exhaustively. We denote by A(P) the set of all the current action types of P, i.e., the set of action types which the component P may next engage in. We denote by Act(P) the multiset of all the current activities of P. Thanks to the exponential assumption, the probability that a particular activity completes is the ratio between its rate and the exit rate from P.
Underlying Markov Chain. Let P def = P 0 with ds(P) = {P 0 , . . . , P n } be a finite PEPA model. Then, the stochastic process X (t) on the space ds(P) is a continuous time Markov chain [13] . The transition rate between two states P i and P j is denoted by q(P i , P j ) and corresponds to the rate at which the system changes from behaving as component P i to behaving as P j , i.e., it is the sum of the activity rates labelling arcs which connect the node corresponding to P i to the node corresponding to P j in the derivation graph, i.e., 
When P j is not a one-step derivative of P i we set q(P i , P j ) = 0. In the following, when possible, we will write q i j instead of q(P i , P j ). In the definition of the infinitesimal generator Q of X (t), the q i j 's, with i j, are the off-diagonal elements of the matrix whereas the diagonal elements are the negative sum of the row non-diagonal elements, i.e., q ii = −q(P i ). For any finite and irreducible PEPA model P, the steady-state distribution Π(·) exists and it may be found by solving the probability normalising equation and the linear system of global balance equations: P i ∈ds(P ) Π(P i ) = 1 and ΠQ = 0. Another notion that will be used in the paper is that of conditional transition rate from P i to P j via an action type α, denoted by q(P i , P j , α). This is the sum of the activity rates labelling arcs connecting the corresponding nodes in the derivation graph which are also labelled by the action type α. It is the rate at which a system behaving as component P i evolves to behaving as component P j as the result of completing a type α activity. The total conditional transition rate from P to S ⊆ ds(P), q[P , S, α], is defined as
Observation Equivalence. We consider a bisimulation-like equivalence notion for PEPA components, named lumpable bisimilarity, that we previously introduced in [14] .
Two PEPA components are lumpably bisimilar if there exists an equivalence relation between them such that, for any action type α different from τ , the total conditional transition rates from those components to any equivalence class, via activities of this type, are the same. Notice that, in contrast with the notion of strong equivalence [13] , lumpable bisimulation allows arbitrary activities with type τ among components belonging to the same equivalence class, and therefore it is less strict.
We are interested in the relation which is the largest lumpable bisimulation, that is the union of all lumpable bisimulations. 
≈ l is called lumpable bisimilarity and it is the largest symmetric lumpable bisimulation over PEPA components.
We proved that for any PEPA component P, lumpable bisimilarity induces a partition of the derivative set ds(P) of P into equivalence classes that is a strong lumpability [16] for the underlying Markov chain. Moreover, the aggregated process satisfies the property that the steady state probability of each aggregated macro-state is equal to the sum of the steady state probabilities of the corresponding equivalent states in the initial CTMC.
Finally in [14] we proved that lumpable bisimilarity is a congruence, i.e., if P 1 ≈ l P 2 then • (α , r ).P 1 ≈ l (α , r ).P 2 for all α ∈ A;
STOCHASTIC NON-INTERFERENCE
In this section we recall the security property named Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI) for PEPA components which aim at characterizing classes of processes having no information flows from high to low. Property PSNI tries to capture every possible information flow from a classified (high) level of confidentiality to an untrusted (low) one. The definition of PSNI is based on the basic idea of Non-Interference [10] : "No information flow is possible from high to low if what is done at the high level cannot interfere in any way with the low level". Hence, the notion of PSNI consists of checking all the states reachable by the system against all high level potential interactions.
In order to formally define this security property, we partition the set A \ {τ } of visible action types, into two sets, H and L, of high and low level action types, respectively. A high level PEPA component H is a PEPA term such that for all H ′ ∈ ds(H ), A(H ′ ) ⊆ H , i.e., every derivative of H may next engage in only high level actions. We denote by C H the set of all high level PEPA components.
A system P satisfies property PSNI if for every state P ′ reachable from P and for every high level process H a low level user cannot distinguish P ′ running in isolation or, equivalently, P ′ running in parallel with any high level PEPA component that does not
In other words, a system P satisfies PSNI if what a low level user sees of the system is not modified when it cooperates with any high level process H .
In order to model a process P running in isolation we introduce the special model component 0 and extend the syntax of model, non-sequential, PEPA components as
We model a process P running in isolation or, equivalently, running in parallel with any high level PEPA component that does not The observation equivalence at the base of our definition relies on the notion of lumpable bisimilarity and this ensures that, for a secure process P, the steady state probability of observing the system being in a specific state P ′ is independent from its possible high level interactions.
Notice that (P ′ ▷ ◁ H 0) does not engage in any high level activity and then the derivation graphs of (P ′ ▷ ◁ H 0) and (P ′ ▷ ◁ H 0)/H are isomorphic as graphs with labels and edges. More precisely, (P ′ ▷ ◁ H 0) behaves as the component P ′ prevented from performing any high level activity. We can thus express the behaviour of (P ′ ▷ ◁ H 0) by using the restriction operator (\) as defined for instance in CCS, as P \ H . From now on we use the notation P \ H as a shorthand of (P ′ ▷ ◁ H 0)/H . The definition of PSNI can be expressed as:
In [15] we provided two characterizations of PSNI : one based on bisimulation-like equivalence checks and another one based on unwinding conditions which demand properties of individual actions.
The first characterization of PSNI is based on an observation equivalence where actions from H may be ignored. We introduced the notion of lumpable bisimilarity up to H . We also provided a characterization of PSNI in terms of unwinding conditions. In practice, whenever a state P ′ of a PSNI PEPA model P may execute a high level activity leading it to a state P ′′ , then P ′ and P ′′ are indistinguishable for a low level observer. Theorem 3.5. Let P be a PEPA component. P ∈ PSN I iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P),
Using the equivalence relation ≈ H l this can be reformulated as follows.
Theorem 3.6. Let P be a PEPA component. P ∈ PSN I iff ∀P ′ ∈ ds(P), P ′ (h,r ) − −−− → P ′′ implies P ′ ≈ H l P ′′ . Example 3.7. The aim of this first example is to support the intuition underlying the definition of PSNI. Let us consider a system offering some public access to two types of customers: the first consists of ordinary customers without any special privilege, while the second is formed by the users with administrative privileges who can access to some confidential information stored in the system. A malicious user is not interested in attacking the system while ordinary users are interacting since a successful attempt would lead to an irrelevant leakage of information. On the contrary, an attack while the system is in its 'Confidential' state may lead to a valuable leakage of information. Hence, it becomes crucial for the system to hide its operating state to low-level users at any time epoch.
The model is depicted in Figure 1 . High-level users can force the system to move from the state 'Ordinary' to the state 'Confidential' and vice-versa with the actions b H and e H (standing for 'begin' and 'end', respectively). Once the system is in the 'Confidential' state, the high-level user interacts by means of the action type qc H (standing for query at confidential state). A low-level user can interact with the system in the following ways:
• Action types qc L and qo L (query at confidential and at ordinary, respectively) functionally allow the user to understand that the system is in the 'Confidential' or 'Ordinary' state: for example, a request for service could produce a message displaying that an update is being run if the system is in the 'Confidential' state or the expected reply otherwise. • Action type q L allows the low-level user to interact with the system without being able to distinguish its functionality from that observed when the system state is 'Ordinary'. In fact, the action type q L is exposed in both state 'Ordinary' and 'Confidential'. It is clear that the system, in this form, is not secure. In fact, action types qc L and qo L simply allow the malicious user to understand its state. Indeed, the states 'Ordinary' and 'Confidential' are not lumpable bisimilar for a low level observer since they expose a different set of low-level actions.
Let us consider the model depicted in Figure 2 that is obtained from the one of Figure 1 by suppressing the action types qc L and qo L . The obtained model satisfies PSNI iff α 4 = α 5 . If this is not the case, the malicious attacker may infer the state of the system thanks to the sequence of response times obtained by a set of queries. In other words, the state of the system can be inferred not only by its functional properties but also by its non-functional properties.
DELIMITED NON-INTERFERENCE
The notion of PSNI is too demanding when dealing with practical applications: indeed no real policy ever guarantees a total absence of information flow. In many concrete applications confidential data can flow from high to low provided that the flow is not direct and it is controlled by the system, i.e., a trusted part of the system can control the downgrading of sensitive information.
In this section we show how our security property can be generalized in order to obtain a notion of stochastic non-interference for PEPA components which allows systems to intentionally release some information.
To model downgrading we now partition the set A \ {τ } of visible action types, into three sets, H , L and D of high, low and downgraded action types. Downgraded action types are used to specify the behaviour of trusted components interacting with the system. We assume that the low level users cannot observe the actions performed by the trusted part.
We generalize the notation expressed in terms of (\) in the previous section. Indeed, for a given PEPA component P and a set of action types L ∈ A \ {τ }, we denote by P \ L the component P prevented from performing any activity whose action type belongs to L.
Delimited Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (D_PSN I ) can be formalized as follows. Notice that this definition states that a system P satisfies D_PSNI if whenever it does not cooperate with a trusted part, what a low level user sees of the system is not modified when it cooperates with any high level process H . Hence, flows from the high level to the trusted part and flows from the trusted part to the low level are admissible, while direct flows from the high level to the low one are not allowed.
As in the case of PSN I , property D_PSN I can be equivalently written as: We also provide a characterization of D_PSNI in terms of unwinding conditions which demand properties of individual activities. This characterization of D_PSN I is stated below. Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 provide different characterizations of D_PSNI which naturally lead to efficient methods for the verification and construction of secure systems. A decision algorithm for D_PSNI is presented in Section 5.
Example 4.6. Let us consider the model depicted in Figure 3 that represents a confidential query to a database system. Starting from the left-most state, the system waits for a request req H that uses a private channel, e.g., a channel based on a asymmetric cryptography. Upon the reception of the request, the system negotiates a symmetric key that will be used to transfer the reply (enc D ). This phase is observable by a malicious user, but by using the downgrading we are stating that we tolerate the information flow that happens up to this point. The following τ activity represents the computation of the reply. At this point, we may observe two behaviours: either the computation is successful or it is unsuccessful. In the former case, the system transmits on the private channel the acknowledge ok H , then begins (beginFile L ) and ends (endFile L ) the transmission of the reply encrypted with the shared key negotiated before. For this reason, these activities are modelled by means of
encD, α3 τ, α4 okH , α5 Figure 4 : Secure database query.
low-level action types. In the case of failure, the system transmits an error message (beginErr L , endErr L ). Let us analyse the information flow in the system. Notice that once a malicious observer sees the action type enc D , he/she can infer that a query has been started. However, thanks to the downgrading, we consider that this flow is acceptable because we trust the security of the system in this phase. In contrast, action type ok H is not protected (although cannot be seen by the malicious user) since it is followed by a beginFile L action type. Therefore, the observer can deduce the state of the query by inferring that it has been successful if it sees beginFile L after enc D , or unsuccessful if it sees beginErr L after enc D . Formally, this can be seen since the states depicted by squares in Figure 3 are not lumpable bisilimilar from a low-level point of view.
One possible solution to this leakage of information is shown in Figure 4 . First of all, we avoid the use of different action types for signalling the error. This means, for example, that the error message must use the same service (e.g., TCP port) as the correct reply message. Second, it is important that the distribution of the size of the reply and error message is the same (in our case proportional to an exponential random variable with parameter α 1 ). If this is not the case, a malicious observer could be able to probabilistically infer the reply the outcome of the query (successful, unsuccessful) by the transmission time of the reply.
Here we prove some compositionality results that allow us to check the security of a system by only verifying the security of its subcomponents. In particular we prove that D_PSN I is compositional with respect to non-high prefix, hiding, and cooperation over a set of low actions. We also prove that if P ∈ D_PSN I then the equivalence class [P] with respect to lumpable bisimilarity ≈ l is closed under D_PSNI. 
A DECISION ALGORITHM
We briefly describe an algorithm to decide whether a PEPA component having a finite set of derivatives is D_PSNI.
In [1] an algorithm has been presented for solving the labelcompatibility problem. The algorithm works on directed labelled weighted graphs defined as follows.
Definition 5.1. (Directed labelled weighted graph) A directed labelled weighted graph is a tuple G = (V , Lab, E, w) where:
• V is a finite set of vertices;
• Lab is a finite set of labels;
• E ⊆ V × V × Lab is a finite set of labelled edges;
• w : E → R is a weighting function that associates a value to each edge.
Given V ′ ⊆ V , we denote by w(v, V ′ , a) the sum of the weights of the edges from v to V ′ having label a.
The label-compatibility problem is an extension to labelled weighed graphs of the problem described in [25] .
Definition 5.2. (Label-Compatibility Problem) Let G = (V , Lab, E, w) be a directed labelled weighted graph and R ⊆ V × V be an equivalence relation over V . R is said to be label-compatible with G if for each a ∈ Lab, for each C, C ′ ∈ V /R, and for each v, v ′ ∈ C it holds that w(v, C ′ , a) = w(v ′ , C ′ , a). Moreover, the labelled weighted compatibility problem over G requires to compute the largest equivalence relation label-compatible with G.
In [1] it has been presented an algorithm, named LCW (_), for solving the label-compatibility problem on G and it has been proved that the label-compatibility problem has always a unique solution which can be computed in time O(|V |+|E| log |V |). Here we consider the algorithm LCW (_) described in [1] where the initial relation is the total relation.
The problem of deciding P ≈ l Q can be reduced to a labelcompabitility problem. Hence, by Theorem 4.5 we immediately get an algorithm for deciding P ∈ D_PSN I in polynomial time with respect to the dimension of ds(P). This algorithm consists of evaluating whether P ′ \ H ∪ D ≈ l P ′′ \ H ∪ D, for each P ′ , P ′′ ∈ ds(P) such that P ′ (h,r ) − −−− → P ′′ . However, we can improve on the above algorithm and reduce the problem of deciding P ∈ D_PSN I to a single run of LCW (_) Notice that the downgrading graph is not necessarily connected. The algorithm LCW (Down P ) returns a binary relation P. In order to decide whether P ∈ D_PSN I we have to check that whenever P ′ (h,r ) − −−− → P ′′ is an edge in the derivation graph D(P), then (P ′ , P ′′ ) ∈ P. This test is performed by Algorithm 1 that computes DPSN I (D(P)). The computation of Down(P) at line 2 can be performed in linear time with respect to the size of D(P) by applying the rules of Definition 5.3. Notice that the graph Down(P) has size at most equal to the size of D(P). Once LCW (Down(P)) has computed the relation P the for-loop at lines 4-8 checks that the conditions of Theorem 4.5 are satisfied.
Let E P be the transitions in D(P). The following theorem states the correctness of our algorithm and evaluates its time complexity. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a form of delimited persistent information flow security property for stochastic processes specified as terms of a quantitative process algebra, namely Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA). Our property D_PSNI is based on a bisimulation based observation equivalence for the PEPA terms which induces a lumping on the underlying Markov chain. The aim of our definition is that of protecting systems from maliciuos attackers which are able to measure also the timing properties of the system, e.g., the response time or the throughput. Property D_PSNI implements a notion of intransitive non-interference: flows from the high level to a trusted part and flows from the trusted part to the low level are admissible since they are intended to be controlled by the trusted part, while a direct flow from high to low is not allowed.
In this paper we also deal with compositionality issues and prove that D_PSNI is compositional with respect to non-high prefix, hiding and cooperation over low level actions. The relationships between PSNI and D_PSNI are formally stated. Moreover, a decision algorithm for D_PSNI is presented
As a future work we plan to relax the definition of Non-Interference by introducing metrics that allow us to measure the security degree of a system in terms of probabilities.
